Approved Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R0 R000500040047-8	
SECRET/ Doctober 1966	
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director	
SUBJECT: Developments and Related Matters	
REFERENCES: (a) (b) (c)	• •
1. McNamara Briefing This is a short cable you	
should read. McNamara and Natzembach were briefed on and	
related matters in Amb. Lodge's presence. McNamara seemed pleased at the way things are being handled. I told Hart in Washington	. 2
that if McNamara (and, by implication, other concerned Washington	_
parties of equal or greater rank) buys present arrangements, a replace-	
ment Hqs. emissary will not be necessary. If he or others in	
Washington press, however, we will have to send one for Washington onlics.	
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3. Kissinger and the Amnesty/Defection Problem	
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